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ABSTRACT 
This study constituted a qualitative analysis of 
current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management policy.  The 
research was conducted at the request of Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps to review 
current policies and their effectiveness in supporting the 
requirements in the FY 05 NDAA, that all O-7 nominees be 
Joint Service Officer qualified prior to promotion by 
September 30, 2008.  The Marine Corps Joint Officer 
Management Office, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps provided 
all categorical data (O-4 through O-7), the majority of 
which represents 2006, as well as limited historical data 
representing 2003 to 2005.  The data showed a high degree of 
effectiveness of the current policies, and that an increase 
in JPME II seats at the O-4 level would significantly 
increase the percentage of qualified JSO’s.  Currently, the 
number of JSO qualified Brigadier Generals is just above 50 
percent.  Over the next year’s time, the Marine Corps must 
reach 100 percent JSO qualification of Brigadier Generals. A 
follow-on study is needed to forecast O-7 continuation rates 
utilizing specific, career progression data to further 
support the FY 05 NDAA stipulation.   
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I. INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND  
A. INFORMATION 
The United States’ philosophy and doctrine concerning 
joint military capabilities and effectiveness has become the 
dominant factor in both defense training and education.  
Recent military operations in Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
have demonstrated the need for American military forces to 
operate comfortably and proficiently in multiservice, 
multinational, and interagency environments.  The integral 
part to this transformation lies with American military 
officers, as they control the key command and control 
aspects within this environment.  In 2000, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff published their vision to transform the military to 
a higher degree of jointness.  In their document, Joint 
Vision 2020, the importance of joint training and education 
was stated as follows: 
To effect transforming and enduring changes to 
our joint military capabilities, the 
experimentation and implementation process must 
include construction of a wide range of scenarios 
and imaginative conflict simulations to explore 
the shape of future operations….The linchpin of 
progress from vision to experimentation to 
reality is joint training and education-because 
they are the keys to intellectual change.  
Without intellectual change, there is no real 
change in doctrine, organizations, or leaders.  
Thus, the implementation process is dependent 
upon incorporating concepts validated by 
experimentation into joint professional military 





way, individual Service members and units become 
a joint team capable of success across the full 
range of military operations.1 
The Marine Corps’ perception of the importance joint 
capability and effectiveness on future mission 
accomplishment is illustrated in its 21st Century Strategy:   
...Our aims are to evolve maneuver warfare 
tactics, techniques, and procedures to fully 
exploit the joint operational concepts articulated 
in Joint Vision 2020; and evolve our war fighting 
concepts to enhance our ability to participate as 
partners in joint and allied concept development 
and experimentation.2 
Recently, with Congressional approval, the Fiscal Year 
2005 National Defense Authorization Act mandated all 
military officers selected to the grade of O-7 be qualified 
in joint experience and education to the level of Joint 
Service Officer (JSO).  This mandated requirement will take 
effect on September 30, 2008.  All branches of the military 
are working to comply under the same constraints; 
availability of approved joint duty assignments, limited 
seats available for joint education, and current/forecasted 
operational tempo resulting from the Global War on Terror.   
This research will analyze the effectiveness of the 
current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management procedures in 
meeting O-7 Joint Service Officer requirements, based upon 
several current constraints in the officer progression 
cycle.  Additionally, attempts will be made to identify 
“chokepoints” in the current system and possible alternative 
solutions to meeting the JSO requirements. 
                     
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, 2000. 
2 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Strategy 21, 2000. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. Joint Policy History 
Title 10, Section 668 (a) of the U.S. Code defines 
joint matters as; “Matters relating to the integrated 
employment of land, sea and air forces; national military 
strategy; strategic and contingency planning; and the 
command and control of combat operations under unified 
command.3 
Prior to the mid 1980’s, the Department of Defense 
suffered from severe service parochialism.  Each service 
branch concentrated primarily on their mission and 
capabilities alone, without much regard to the capabilities 
and limitations of the other branches.  Additionally, joint 
matters, to include staffing of joint billets, were not 
viewed as critical to future mission success.  Services, for 
the most part, did not send their best and brightest 
performers to fill these billets.  Joint tours were believed 
to be career ending for an individual and a black hole for 
the experience and proficiency the services wanted to 
maintain.  Operational deficiencies in Operations Eagle Claw 
(Iran hostage crisis, 1979) and Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983) 
highlighted to Congress the disjointedness in the nation’s 
joint war fighting capability.  Legislation would be needed 
to ensure future mission success with regards to joint 
capability and joint units were being staffed by educated 
and experienced service members. 
                     
3 United States Code, Title 10, Section 668 (a). 
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The Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) became the “starter’s 
pistol” in DoD’s race to achieve an efficient joint war 
fighting capability.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Sample GNA Reforms4 
 
Figure 1 shows a portion of the Secretary of Defense’s 
responsibilities brought about by the GNA reform.  The 
spirit of the GNA was on improving joint operational 
                     
4 United States Code, Title 10, Chapter 36, Section 619a, and Chapter 
38.  SecDef responsibilities for JOM/JPME. 
Title 10, Chapter 38, requirements 
 Establishes a “joint specialty” in joint 
matters 
 Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) qualify 
through JPME II and experience in a joint 
duty assignment (JDA) 
 SecDef must define JDAs as positions that 
provide significant experience in joint 
matters 
 SecDef must maintain a list of all such 
positions, the JDAL 
 SecDef must fill approximately half of JDAs 
with JSO or JSO nominee 
 SecDef must designate not less than 800 
JDAs as “critical” 
 SecDef must fill critical JDAs with JSOs 
 SecDef must ensure officers in JDAs and 
JSOs are promoted comparably to peers in 
service assignments 
− Joint organizations get a fair share of 
quality officers 
− Officers are not penalized for joint 
duty 
 Officers must serve one full tour in a JDA 
to be eligible for promotion to general or 
flag rank (O-7) (Chapter 36, Section 619a.) 
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capability which gave Joint Officer Management supervision 
and coordination responsibilities to the Secretary of 
Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Unified 
Combatant Commanders.  Management control of joint 
assignments and education were taken away from the services 
and their respective service chiefs. 
Since its inception, this legislation has spawned a new 
generation of joint warfighting doctrine.  The importance of 
this transformation has changed the way crises and conflicts 
are conducted in today’s global environment.  Not only must 
military officers be proficient in multiservice 
environments, but interagency and multinational ones as 
well.  Successful joint operations in Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo, 
and Afghanistan lend credence to the transformational reform 
ideas of the GNA.  In order to promulgate future success, 
joint education and experience must be considered a priority 
by both the individual service member and his/her service 
organization.  In an attempt to decrease fears of negative 
career progression as a result of joint duty, the GNA 
specified that “JSOs as a group must be promoted at a rate 
not lower than that of officers assigned to their service’s 
headquarters.”5 
2. Joint Service Officer (JSO) Qualifications 
Joint Service Officer is a designation bestowed by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) upon an individual 
officer who has completed Joint Professional Military 
Education I and II along with a successful tour in a 
                     
5 Booz Allen Hamilton, Independent Study of Joint Officer Management 
and Joint Professional Military Education, Booz Allen Hamilton:  McLean, 
VA, 2003. 
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designated Joint Duty Assignment.  All officers are 
nominated, in writing, by their respective service to OSD.  
According to the GNA 50 percent of all Joint Duty Assignment 
List (JDAL) billets are to be filled with JSO qualified 
individuals, and 100 percent of critical joint assignments.  
However, each service may submit waivers for each fiscal 
year that do not exceed 10 percent of the total officers 
selected for JSO in each pay grade in that fiscal year.  The 
10 percent of officers who receive waivers must show proof 
of extenuating circumstances that deterred them from meeting 
proper requirements.  This is quite a demanding stipulation 
purposely directed to ensure the services buy into joint 
education and experience.  
This research will concentrate on the availability of 
meeting JSO qualifications for all Brigadier General selects 
in the United States Marine Corps.  The FY 2005 NDAA 
requires all O-7 nominees, effective September 30, 2008, to 
possess the JSO qualification.  Currently, the only officers 
who are nominated without meeting all of the JSO 
requirements are the 10 percent, previously mentioned, and 
those officers with occupational specialties of Lawyer and 
Acquisition Professional.  
3. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Joint professional military education is preferred as a 
prerequisite to being assigned a billet from the JDAL.  The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff highlight this intent in their 
Instruction 3500.01C: 
Personnel selected for joint assignments will be 
trained prior to reaching their duty 
location…Professional development is the product 
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of a learning continuum that comprises training, 
experience, education, and self-development.  The 
role of professional military education is to 
provide the education needed to complement 
training, experience, and self-development to 
produce the most professionally competent 
individual possible.6 
The majority of officers receive JPME I through 
intermediate (Major/O-4) level Professional Military 
Education.  JPME II, on the other hand, is more restricted 
because of limited resident education programs.  The Marine 
Corps only recognizes limited resident education courses and 
no non-resident courses as qualification for JPME II 
certification.  At the intermediate level (Major/O-4), JPME 
II certification is limited to attendance at the 10 week, 
resident Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Intermediate 
(JCWS-I).  Senior level (O-5/O-6) JPME I and II 
certifications are recognized through completion of Service 
Senior level Colleges (SLC); Marine Corps War College, Air 
War College, Army War College, Naval War College, and 
College of Naval Warfare.  Additionally, Senior level JPME 
II certification can be obtained by completing the Joint and 
Combined Warfighting School-Senior (JCWS-S).  Currently, the 
Marine Corps fills 100 percent of allotted JPME II school 
seats on an annual basis, along with additional school seats 




                     
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3500.01C, Joint Training Policy and 
guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2006. 
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4. Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) 
The Department of Defense defines Joint Duty Assignment 
as, “An assignment to a designated position in a 
multiservice or multinational command or activity that is 
involved in the integrated employment or support of the 
land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three 
military departments.  The preponderance of a joint 
officer’s duties involve producing or promulgating national 
military strategy, joint doctrine, joint policy, strategic 
plans, or contingency plans, or to commanding or controlling 
operations under a combatant command.”7 
All officially designated JDAs are contained on the 
JDAL.  As mentioned earlier, 50 percent of JDAs are, by OSD 
directive, to be filled by qualified Joint Service Officers 
or officers nominated for JSO status.  The total number of 
billets on the JDAL has increased from 8,200 in 1987 to in 
excess of 9,000 today.  
 
 
                     
7 Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1300.20, “DoD Joint 
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Figure 2.   Comparison of JDAL to O-4 through O-10 
EndStrength8 
 
Figure 2 shows the increasing number of JDAL billets, 
as defense focus has turned to joint war fighting, compared 
with a decreasing O-4 through O-10 officer end strength.  
Given recent history, it is imperative to note that 
regardless of how officer end strength is affected; the push 
for increasing joint qualified officers has become the 
reality of today’s Department of Defense. 
Historically, the Marine Corps has made significant 
contributions to officer assignments on the JDAL, 
maintaining a staffing policy of approximately 90 percent of 
its allocated positions.9  As of fiscal year 2006, the 
Marine Corps was allocated 669 billets on the JDAL for pay 
grades O-4 through O-6, staffing at 93 percent.10  For the 
                     
8 Booz Allen Hamilton, Independent Study of Joint Officer Management 
and Joint Professional Military Education, Booz Allen Hamilton:  McLean, 
VA, 2003. 




purpose of this research, JDAs below the grade or O-4 or 
above the rank of O-7 will not be examined.  Joint Duty 
Assignments for General/Flag Officers are considered 
nominations, not service-specific fills. 
5. Marine Corps Joint Officer Management 
Currently, the Marine Corps has no service-specific, 
written policy or directive governing its Joint Officer 
Management.  Instead, the Marine Corps utilizes all Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (CJCS) doctrine, directives, and strategic policies 
(Joint Visions 2010 and 2020).  To date, there is no Marine 
Corps Joint Officer Management Order being written, nor are 
there plans to do so. 
C. PURPOSE 
This study will evaluate the effectiveness of the 
current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management procedures as 
they relate to Joint Service Officer qualifications for 
General Officer selects.  The objective is to determine 
whether the current officer career progression, as it 
pertains to joint service experience and education, will 
support the requirements for mandatory Joint Service Officer 
qualification for General/Flag Officers as directed by the 
Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II will contain a literature review of related 
studies concerning Joint Officer Management and strategic 
approaches for increased qualifications in all four military 
branches of service.   
 11
Chapter III will explain sources for current Marine 
Corps joint officer data, methodology used, and provide an 
analysis of the data.  
Chapter IV will conclude this study by attempting to 
identify current process efficiency toward meeting 
forecasted Joint Service Officer requirements.  
Recommendations will be included to guide future Marine 
Corps studies concerning this topic.  
 12
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
There have been numerous studies on Joint Officer 
Management of the reserve and active duty forces.  These 
studies provide a broad outlook on joint criteria 
credibility, as well as proposed strategic approaches to 
meet Department of Defense (DoD) “jointness” goals.  
Although they look at all branches of the military 
inclusively, they contain information relevant to the 
specificity of this research. 
In this chapter, a review is done to gain insight on 
the current situation regarding Joint Officer Management.  
This review, will provide a summary of each study, focus on 
the purpose of the research, models and types of data used, 
and conclusions/recommendations.  Additionally, this chapter 
will summarize the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), which is the basis for Joint 
Service Officer requirements at the General/Flag Officer 
level. 
B. FISCAL YEAR 2005 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
This act was enacted by the One Hundred Eighth Congress 
and is known by the title, “Ronald W. Reagan National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.”  This 
legislation amended numerous Joint Officer Management 
sections under Title X of the U.S. Code.  Most importantly, 
was the change to Section 533 of Title X: 
 14
SEC. 533.  JOINT REQUIREMENTS FOR PROMOTION TO 
FLAG OR GENERAL OFFICER GRADE. 
(a) EFFECTIVE Date for Joint Specialty Officer 
Requirement.-Subsection (a)(2) of section 619a of 
title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
striking “September 30, 2007” and inserting 
“September 30, 2008.”11 
This legislation applied a mandated deadline for 
meeting requirements for the grade of O-7 in all four 
services.  Although congress understands the need to push 
our military towards jointness, the realization of current 
operational tempo and its effect on personnel assignments 
resulted in the new September 2008 deadline.  Nonetheless, 
since Title X was amended by this act, Joint Officer 
Management, Joint Professional Military Education, Joint 
Duty Assignment, and Joint Service Officer designation have 
become increasingly significant to active duty Colonels 
looking for selection to Brigadier General in the Marine 
Corps. 
C. ACTIVE DUTY JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT 
1. Study by Kirby, Crego, Thie, Harrell, Curry, and 
Tseng (2006) 
In their study Who is “Joint?”  New Evidence from the 
2005 Joint Officer Management Survey, Kirby et al. intend to 
“…provide an overview of the survey responses, including the 
extent to which officers believe that their assignments 
provide them with joint experience or require them to have 
                     
11 108th Congress, National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 
2005. 
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prior joint education, training, or experience.”12 This 
study was conducted to enhance the foundation of knowledge 
for future research on joint officer management concerning 
experience requirement and education qualifications of 
potential assignees to joint billets.  At most, this study 
serves as an overview for responses to the above mentioned 
survey. 
The survey was conducted via web based application and 
directed towards three types of “joint” billets.  The types 
of billets addressed are: 
-Billets currently on the Joint Duty Assignment 
List (JDAL) 
-Non-JDAL billets in external organizations that 
have some billets on the JDAL 
-Internal Service billets not on the JDAL that 
were nominated by the services as providing joint 
experience or requiring joint experience or 
education13 
Approximately 30,000 billets were surveyed and 
responses were received from 21,214.  Thus, the response 
rate for the survey was approximately 71 percent.  The 
Marine Corps respondents accounted for only 0.3 percent of 
the sample. 
The authors addressed a number of topic categories in 
their summation.  For instance, when measuring the 
“jointness” of a billet, Kirby et al. selected four tasks as 
units of measure-(1) providing strategic direction and 
                     
12 Kirby et al., “Who is “Joint?” New Evidence from the 2005 Joint 
Officer Management Census Survey, 2006. 
13 Ibid. 
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integration; (2) developing/ assessing joint policies; (3) 
developing/ assessing joint doctrine; and (4) fostering 
multinational, interagency, or regional relations.14 Not 
surprisingly, JDAL and Non-JDAL billets in external 
organizations were at the top of each category.  
Additionally, Marine Corps billets ranked higher than all 
other services on every measure. 
Another important measure researched in the study 
considered the joint education and experience required for 
billet assignment.  Approximately 70 to 80 percent of 
respondents felt as though their billet efficiency required 
both joint education and experience.  Internal service 
organization billets were slightly lower in ranking the 
importance, approximately 60 percent.  For Marine Corps 
assignments, 80 percent ranked joint education and 
experience as critical to assignment. 
Finally, when measuring joint experience provided by a 
billet, the authors concentrated on the level of experience 
that billet provided towards multinational, multiservice, 
and interagency matters.  JDAL billets resulted in the 
majority of experience with the three areas, 87 percent 
gained experience in multiservice matters while 65 to 75 
percent gained multinational and interagency experience.  
Approximately 70 percent of Marine Corps billets in non-
service organizations were reported to provide multiservice 
experience.  “JDAL billets rank first on every indicator,  
 
 
                     
14 Kirby et al., “Who is “Joint?” New Evidence from the 2005 Joint 
Officer Management Census Survey, RAND, 2006. 
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Educational agencies, CENTCOM JTF billets, and billets in 
the geographic commands rank very high on providing 
significant experience in all three areas.”15 
2. Study by Thie, Harrell, Yardley, Oshiro, Potter, 
Schirmer, and Lim (2005) 
In 2005, RAND National Defense Research Institute 
published the study by Thie et al. titled, “Framing a 
Strategic Approach for Joint Officer Management.”  Their 
purpose in conducting this study was to develop a strategic 
approach that would “…provide overarching guidance on 
officer training and development in joint matters to best 
meet DoD’s mission and goals in the context of evolving 
combatant commander and service requirements, revolutionary 
changes in technology, and a dramatic cultural shift in the 
military.”16  In short, the authors do not believe that all 
branches of the military will take the necessary steps to 
ensure they meet national policy requirements for training 
joint officers. 
The data used in the study consisted of longitudinal 
data collected from officer personnel files across all four 
military branches.  The information consisted of joint 
experience and education, Joint Service Officer 
qualifications, and proportion of Joint Duty Assignment List 
(JDAL) billets per service.  Important to note, the authors 
concentrated, for the most part, on those individuals whose 
military occupation specialty have had the preponderance of 
                     
15 Kirby et al., “Who is “Joint?” New Evidence from the 2005 Joint 
Officer Management Census Survey, RAND, 2006. 
16 Thie et al., “Framing a Strategic Approach for Joint Officer 
Management,” RAND, 2005. 
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joint duty requirements.  Additionally, Thie et al. 
conducted personal interviews with officers currently 
filling joint billets, those with past experience, and 
personnel from each branch’s joint officer management 
office.  The interviews provided insight on the positive and 
negative aspects of the current joint officer development 
system.  
As the intent was not to provide an “end all” solution 
to the difficulties of training joint officers, the authors 
chose to provide a strategic framework that will identify 
processes that need to be followed.  Thie et al. recognized 
that all four branches of military are getting progressively 
more joint with every passing year, but perhaps not as 
efficiently as they could be.  The authors conclude that 
their needs to be DoD benchmark concerning the 
characteristics needed in a joint officer (e.g. 
multinational, multiservice, interagency).  Once the 
benchmark is identified, all branches of the military need 
to conduct a thorough examination of personnel files in 
order to measure current progress in meeting the benchmark.  
Only after an accurate picture of current status is obtained 
can a model then be implemented to forecast probability of 
meeting future goals.  The authors noted that it is 
important to ensure that models account for the two 
predominant constraints in joint officer development, number 
of Joint Duty Assignment billets and Joint Professional 




D. RESERVE JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT 
1. Study by Thie, Harrell, Kirby, Crego, Yardley, 
and Nagda (2006) 
In 2006, RAND National Defense Research Institute 
published a study by Thie et al. titled, “Framing a 
Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer 
Management.”  The purpose for this study was to continue the 
research from the previously mentioned study on the active 
component, in order to account for the decreased limitations 
faced by reserve officers, vice the active component, as 
they strive to meet joint education and experience 
standards. The authors focus on “framing a strategic 
approach to reserve joint officer management that (a) 
addresses the requirements for and the supply of joint 
officers for the reserve component and (b) accounts for the 
unique constraints of and challenges to reserve joint 
officer management.”17 
The authors used the same 2005 Joint Officer Management 
Census Survey as previously used in Kirby, et al.’s survey 
on the active component, discussed earlier in the chapter.  
Restated, this survey analyzed approximately 21,000 current 
billets, joint or potentially joint.   
The author’s concentrated their efforts by focusing on 
reserve active-status list officers and their 
qualifications.  They discovered that, currently, there is 
minimal information in personnel data systems as to the 
joint education and experience of these officers.  Thie, et 
                     
17 Thie et al., “Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component 
Joint Officer Management,” 2005. 
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al. suggest that a one time data inventory be conducted to 
capture this missing information and consistent updates 
follow periodically.  Additionally,  the authors make 
general recommendations as to a proper strategic approach 
for joint officer management.  The base of their 
recommendations is to detect current and projected overages 
and shortages of joint qualified reserve officers, followed 





III. DATA SOURCES, GENERAL METHODOLOGY, DATA 
ANALYSIS 
A. DATA SOURCES 
The data for this research was assembled from the Joint 
Officer Management database operated by the Joint Officer 
Management Office, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.  For the purpose of this 
research, the data was restricted to Field Grade Officers 
(O-4 through O-6).  Although limited JDAL billets exist for 
pay grades O-1 through O-3, JPME II school seats are 
unavailable, thus, junior officers will not be included in 
the scope of this research.  Since FY 05 NDAA requires that 
O-7 selects be JSO qualified before nomination, very little 
data was analyzed for this pay grade.  The majority of the 
data represented is for fiscal year 2006.  Unfortunately, 
limited historical data was available.  The original 
analysis was to compare similar data categories over recent 
years to establish accurate patterns within each data 
category, but, only 2006 data was available for the 
analysis. 
As shown in Table 1, the categories of information 
collected and considered relevant to this research are 
broken down by pay grade and include; current active duty 
officer inventory, JSO (full/partial) active duty officer 
inventory, promotion rates (general), Joint Service Officer 
(full/partial) promotion rates, JPME II school seats, and 
allotted JDAL billets.   
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Table 1.   MC Joint Officer Management Data, 2006.18 
 
  0-4 0-5 0-6 0-7 Total
Current Inventory Active 
Duty Officers 3,583 1,823 659 40 6,105
Partially qualified JSO 
(No JPME II) 69 174 151 14 408 
Full JSO qualification 48 171 197 23 439 
Promotion rates (general) 90.00% 70.00% 52.00% 1.20%  
Promotion rates 
(Full/partial JSO) 0.00% 83.30% 80.00% 6.30%  
Current JDA billet 
inventory 304 264 101 N/A 669 





      54 
JPME II seat fills 28 60 14 N/A 102 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the extent of historical 
Joint Officer Management (JOM) data available for this 
research.  Historical data was limited to the following 
categories; Number of full/partially JSO-qualified Marine 
Corps officers and Joint Primary Military Education II (JPME 
II) seat allotment and fill rates.  None of the historical 







                     






















Figure 3.   Full/Partial JSO Qualified MC Officers (O-4 
through O-7) Annual Trend19 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the number of fully qualified 
Joint Service Officers has continued to increase over the 
past 3 years, from 347 in 2004 to 439 in 2006.  However, 
also evident is the sudden decrease from 2005 to 2006 in 
those field grade officers who were partially qualified, 
minus the JPME II certification.  The data showed there was 
no peculiar reasoning behind the sudden drop in the 
partially qualified numbers, other than the typical 







                     














JPME II Seat Fills
JPME II Seats Alloted
 
Figure 4.   MC JPME II Seat Allotments/Fills (O-4 through 
O-6) Annual Trend20 
 
Figure 4 shows the recent trend in JPME II allocated 
and filled Marine Corps school seats.  The number of 
allocated resident school seats to the Marine Corps has 
remained the same in recent years, 54 annual JPME II seats.  
The data showed a noticeable increase in seats filled which 
are continually increasing. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this study will consist of an 
analysis of current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management 
policy and statistical data in order to understand the 
effectiveness of these policies on Joint Service Officer 
requirements and provide recommendations for areas of 
improvement in order to reach the goals set forth by the 
Fiscal year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act.  The 
primary data for this policy analysis will be the 2006 Joint 
                     
20 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, 
Marine Corps. 
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Officer Management data, shown previously in Table 1.  Each 
portion of the categorical data will be segregated for 
further analysis.   
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
The vast majority of Marine Corps officers (O-4 through 
O-6) who serve in JDAL billets and JPME II resident school 
seats will be the focus of the data.  Additionally, it is 
imperative that the Marine Corps concentrate on these pay 
grades in order to fully qualify all potential Brigadier 
General nominees as Joint Service Officers. 
1. Current Marine Corps Active Duty Officer 
Inventory 








Figure 5.   Marine Corps Field Grade Officer Inventory21 
 
The number of Marine Corps field grade officers serves 
as the base from which all other descriptive statistics 
could be drawn. Not surprisingly, over half of all field 
grade officers in the Marine Corps are at the O-4 level.   
 
                     
21 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, 
Marine Corps. 
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Additionally, the pay grade of O-5 contains approximately 30 
percent of field grade officers and approximately 11 percent 
at the O-6 level.  









Figure 6.   Major/O-4 JSO Qualification Breakdown22 
 








Figure 7.   Lieutenant Colonel/O-5 JSO Qualification 
Breakdown23 
 
                     













Figure 8.   Colonel/O-6 JSO Qualification Breakdown24 
 
Figures 6, 7, and 8, show the breakdown of full and 
partially qualified Joint Service Officers by pay grade.  
According to the data, although it contains the largest 
inventory of officers, the grade of O-4 shows the highest 
percentage of officers with no JSO qualifications at 
approximately 97 percent.  The highest percentage of in-
grade inventory having full JSO qualification surfaces at 
the O-6 level.  The relationship between pay grade and 
extent of JSO qualification is justified, primarily, by time 
in service and additional billet and educational 






                     
24 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, 
Marine Corps. 
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3. Promotion Rates 
Table 2.   Field Grade Officer Promotion Rates25 
 
  0-4 0-5 0-6 
Promotion rates (general) 90.00%70.00%52.00% 
Promotion rates (Full/partial JSO) 0.00% 83.30%80.00% 
 
The data shown in Table 2 represents both the general 
promotion rate for field grade officers, as well as the 
promotion rate for full/partially qualified field grade 
officers.  As discussed earlier, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff directed that all personnel taking the opportunity 
to fill joint billets and resident schools should be 
promoted, at a minimum, at the same rate as their peers.  
Figure 9 shows the evidence that Marine Corps officers at 
the O-5 and O-6 levels, with full or partial JSO 
qualifications, are being promoted at a rate significantly 
above that of their peers.  However, it is impossible to 
derive the amount of influence JSO qualifications actually 
had on these promotions.  It is possible that many of those 
who were promoted with JSO qualifications would have been 







                     
25 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, 
Marine Corps. 
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4. Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Inventory 









Figure 9.   Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Billet 
Allocation26 
 
Figure 9 represents the 2006 JDAL billet inventory for 
Marine Corps field grade officers, showing that the majority 
of billets are allocated for the O-4 level.  However, more 
than 80 percent of Marine Corps JDAL billets are staffed at 
the O-4 or O-5 pay grades. Although the data stands alone as 
a snapshot in time, the overall billet allocations do not 
change significantly from year to year.  Evidence of this 
was shown in Figure 2, where JDAL inventory increased by 
approximately 800 billets in the time between 1987 and 2007.  
Initially, this upward trend was seen as alarming when 
coupled with a decrease in overall end strength of pay 
grades O-4 through O-10 during the same time period.  
Limited historical data was available to forecast what, if 
any, the recently approved force structure increase (Global  
 
 
                     
26 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, 
Marine Corps. 
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War on Terror) will have on future JDAL billet inventory.  
Although likely to increase, it is difficult to predict the 
rate at which it will increase.  
5. Joint Primary Military Education II (JPME II) 
Availability/Fills 








Figure 10.   JPME II Attendance for AY 200627 
 
As the second half of the requirement for Joint Service 
Officer qualification, JDAL billet experience being the 
other, JPME II school seat data is integral to analyzing 
current Marine Corps Joint Officer Management policies and 
procedures.  The annual Marine Corps JPME II seat allocation 
has remained steady at 54 over the last 3 years.  The Joint 
Officer Management Office was unable to provide the actual 
breakdown of those seats by pay grade.  As Figure 10 shows, 
the Marine Corps continues to fill seat levels above 
allocation.  According to the data, the primary target of 
JPME II assignments is at the O-5 level, which more than 
doubles the seats filled annually by officers at the O-4 
level.  The O-6 level registers half as many annual seats as 
                     
27 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, 
Marine Corps. 
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the O-4 level officers.  Presumably, the reason for this 
disparity is that most officers received their JPME II at 
the O-5 level.  The data shows that, at the O-5 level, 
officers have more varied opportunities to acquire JPME II 
education when compared to officers at the O-4 and O-6 
level.  As previously examined, the largest inventory of 
Marine Corps field grade officers exist at the O-4 level, 
but they have the least frequent opportunity to attend the 
only resident school that will certify them at the JPME II 
level, the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-
Intermediate (JCWS-I). 
6. General Officer Categorical Data 
Table 3.   Joint Officer Management Categorical Data for 
Marine Corps Brigadier Generals/O-7s28 
 
Current Inventory Active Duty 
Officers 40 
Partially qualified JSO (No JPME II) 14 
Full JSO qualification 23 
Promotion rates (general) 1.20% 
Promotion rates (Full/partial JSO) 6.30% 
 
As this research focuses on the analysis of the Marine 
Corps Joint Officer Management system and its effectiveness 
in meeting Joint Service Officer requirements for O-7 
nominees, inclusion of categorical data for this pay grade 
seemed logical.  Table 3 above illustrates some basic, 
categorical data for Marine Corps O-7s similar to data 
displayed earlier in this chapter.  Interesting to note is 
the large proportion of Brigadier Generals with full or 
                     
28 Data collected from Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, 
Marine Corps. 
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partial JSO qualification (92.5 percent); 57.5 percent are 
fully qualified Joint Service Officers, and 35 percent are 
partially qualified (minus JPME II education).  
Additionally, given the promotion rates to O-7 (1.2 
percent), and the current statistical rate of promotion for 
the aforementioned full/partially qualified JSO (6.3 
percent), the data shows tremendous progress towards meeting 
the requirement of 100 percent JSO qualified O-7 nominees.  
What the data does not show are JDAL billet inventory and 
JPME II school seat allocation and fill rates.  Assignment 
and allocation for O-7s to both categories is nominative and 
not predetermined, thus statistically significant data was 
not available.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act 
requires that all officers, nominated for promotion to the 
pay grade of O-7, meet Joint Service Officer (JSO) 
qualifications, effective September 30, 2008.  The goal of 
this research was to examine the Marine Corps’ effectiveness 
in meeting this JSO requirement by analyzing Marine Corps 
Joint Officer Management (JOM) policy and historical data. A 
Department of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instructions and Directives review found no Marine Corps JOM 
policy or guidelines.  Additionally, Marine Corps Active 
Duty Officer (O-4 through O-7) categorical data, sufficient 
for 2006 and limited for 2003 to 2005, was provided by the 
Joint Officer Management Office, Headquarters, U.S. Marine 
Corps.   
The data showed that current Marine Corps JOM 
procedures are effective in providing the education and 
billet experience needed to create Joint Service Officers 
but efficiencies can still be found.  Approximately 90 
percent of the current inventory of Brigadier Generals 
appear to be fully or partially JSO qualified. A lack of 
JPME II was found to be the reason for partial 
qualifications.   The data clearly shows the increase in 
Joint Service Officers as pay grade increases from O-4 to O-
6.  Although the preponderance of JDAL assignments are 
allocated to O-4 level officers, the majority of 
opportunities for JPME II attendance lies in the O-5 and O-6 
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level.  The research strongly shows that, although the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) intended to have 
officers attend JPME II prior to being assigned to a JDAL 
billet, all officers in the pay grades O-4 through O-7 
(within the sourced data), having JDAL billet credit, were 
partially JSO qualified due to lack of JPME II 
certification.  Although the Marine Corps annually fills 
more than its allotted school seats, this lack of JPME II 
seats appears to the “chokepoint” in meeting the FY 05 NDAA 
requirement of O-7 JSO qualification.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
As the research shows, JPME II certification is the 
constraint between partial and fully qualified Joint Service 
Officers.  Also, the Marine Corps’ Joint Officer Management 
policies would benefit from the following recommendations: 
• Collect, centralize, and maintain Joint Officer 
Management categorical information on all Active 
Duty officers in the Marine Corps to provide 
accurate and timely data. 
• Work with other branches of DoD to create 
additional JPME II opportunities for the O-4 level 
officers prior to assignment in a joint billet. 
• Despite current and future operational tempo, 
continue to staff the JDAL above 90 percent. 
In the coming years, the Joint Service Officer 
requirement for promotion to O-7 will become a high 
visibility issue with regards to O-6 retention in the Marine 
Corps.  A future study may be needed to model continuation 
rates of O-7 Joint Service Officers, taking into account 
Time in grade, retention statistics, and self-selection 
criteria. 
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